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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 CardioNet, Inc. and LifeWatch Services, Inc. are 
providers of medical devices that allow physicians to monitor 
cardiac arrhythmias in patients not confined to the hospital.  
For several years, CIGNA Health Corporation provided 
coverage for this service.  Then, in 2012, CIGNA reversed 
course and announced that it would no longer do so.  
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CardioNet and LifeWatch filed this action against CIGNA on 
their own behalf and as the assignee of patients who used 
their services.  In response, CIGNA moved to compel 
arbitration under the parties’ agreement.  The District Court 
agreed with CIGNA that CardioNet and LifeWatch’s claims 
fell within the arbitration clause of the parties’ agreement and 
therefore compelled arbitration.  Because we conclude that 
none of CardioNet and LifeWatch’s claims fall within the 
arbitration clause, we vacate the District Court’s judgment 
and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I.
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A. 
                                              
2
 CIGNA bases its motion to compel arbitration on language 
in the parties’ contracts.  Those contracts, though not 
appended to the Complaint, are integral to, and referenced in, 
the Complaint.  Because the arbitration clause at issue 
appears in a contract relied upon in the Complaint, we resolve 
the motion to compel arbitration under a motion to dismiss 
standard, Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 
716 F.3d 764, 773-75 (3d Cir. 2013), and accept as true the 
factual allegations set forth in the Complaint, Bell v. 
Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 192 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2013).  We are also permitted to consider the substance of the 
contracts that ostensibly compel arbitration.  See In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (noting that “a document integral to or explicitly 
relied upon in the complaint may be considered” at the 
motion to dismiss stage (quotation marks and emphasis 
omitted)). 
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 CardioNet, Inc. and LifeWatch Services, Inc. 
(together, “the Providers”) supply outpatient cardiac 
telemetry (“OCT”) services.  OCT, an outpatient device, is 
used by physicians, usually cardiologists, to monitor cardiac 
arrhythmias.  The device differs from conventional 
technologies for detecting arrhythmias in that it transmits 
electrocardiographic (“EKG”) data in real time to certified 
technicians, who then forward the data to the ordering 
physician.  OCT is approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration, and has been covered by Medicare and 
commercial insurers for many years.   
 
 CIGNA Healthcare Corporation administers employer 
sponsored health and welfare benefit plans across the country.  
Like other health insurance companies, CIGNA maintains a 
network of health care providers.  Pursuant to individual 
agreements between CIGNA and its in-network providers, 
CIGNA pays the providers directly for the services rendered 
to patients.   
 
 In 2007, CardioNet and LifeWatch joined CIGNA’s 
provider network by entering into identical Administrative 
Service Agreements with CIGNA (“the Agreement”).  The 
Agreement sets the rate at which CIGNA would reimburse 
the Providers for the particular services rendered to CIGNA 
patients.  It also circumscribes the services for which 
reimbursement is available.  Specifically, the Providers’ 
services are reimbursable under the Agreement only if they 
constitute “Covered Services.”  App. at 65, 72.  The 
Agreement defines “Covered Services” as “those health care 
services for which a Participant is entitled to receive coverage 
under the terms and conditions of the Participant’s Benefit 
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Plan.”  Id. at 64.3  According to the Agreement, “[n]o service 
is a Covered Service unless it is Medically Necessary,” that is 
it “satisfies the Medical Necessity requirements under the 
applicable Benefit Plan.”  Id. 
 
B. 
 
 CIGNA first announced a policy of covering OCT in 
2007.  At the time, it determined that there was “sufficient 
evidence in the published peer reviewed medical literature 
supporting the use of home-based, real-time surveillance 
systems.”  App. at 35.  CIGNA maintained and reaffirmed its 
policy of covering OCT each year through 2011.  But then, in 
2012, it abruptly terminated its coverage of OCT; CIGNA 
then issued a new policy statement, entitled 2012 Cardiac 
Event Monitor Coverage Policy (“the 2012 Policy”), 
announcing that it would no longer cover OCT “for any 
indication because it is considered experimental, 
investigational or unproven.”  Id. at 25, 37.  The 2012 Policy 
acknowledged, however, that this new position would be 
trumped by any conflicting language in the coverage policies 
themselves.   
 
 Although CIGNA’s OCT policy had changed, its 
medical knowledge had not: CIGNA relied on the same 
medical literature it had previously relied upon in concluding 
that OCT should be covered.  Shortly after CIGNA’s 
announcement, the Providers asked CIGNA to reconsider its 
new position on OCT.  According to the Complaint, CIGNA 
                                              
3
 The Agreement defines “Participant” as “any individual, or 
eligible dependent of such individual, . . . who is eligible and 
enrolled to receive Covered Services.”  Id. 
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intimated to the Providers that its motive for reversing course 
was financial, but refused to back away from the 2012 Policy.   
 
 Subsequently, CIGNA issued Medical Coverage 
Policy Updates for Heath Care Professionals (“the Physician 
Update”) to hundreds of thousands of its network physicians, 
announcing that it would not cover OCT “for any indication 
because it is considered [experimental, investigational, and 
unproven].”  App. 40-41.  By letter, CardioNet objected to 
CIGNA’s characterization of OCT as experimental, 
investigational, and unproven.  CardioNet’s letter also 
observed that CIGNA’s unequivocal statement that CIGNA 
would not cover OCT “for any indications” conflicted with its 
acknowledgement in the 2012 Policy that CIGNA’s new 
position could be trumped by the specific coverage policies 
included in employee benefit plans.  Id.  CIGNA neither 
responded to the letter nor amended the Physician Update.  
The Providers allege that the Physician Update not only 
prevented patients with CIGNA insurance from ordering 
OCT, but also “has caused and continues to cause physicians 
to refrain from ordering OCT for patients whose employer 
plans . . . do cover OCT.”  Id. at 41.   
 
C. 
 
 The Providers filed this action in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, “on their own behalves and as assignees of 
the rights and claims of patients.”  App. at 24.  The Complaint 
contains seven counts.  The Providers bring Counts I-IV as 
the assignees of the claims of five CIGNA plan participants 
(“the Participants”).  The Participants all sought coverage for 
OCT after the implementation of the 2012 Policy, and were 
all denied coverage by CIGNA.  After CIGNA denied 
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coverage, the Participants received OCT from the Providers, 
and in exchange assigned to the Providers “all of [their] rights 
(without limitation) under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) . . . along with any other rights 
under federal or state law that [they] may have as related to 
the reimbursement of coverage” for the uncovered treatment.  
Id. at 284.   
 
 Counts I-IV, the so-called “derivative” counts, 
challenge CIGNA’s decision to deny the Participants OCT 
coverage; the Providers bring these claims standing in the 
shoes of the Participants.  Specifically, in Count I, the 
Providers allege that CIGNA arbitrarily and capriciously 
changed its OCT coverage policy, and seek to recover 
benefits due under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(1)(B).  In Count II, the Providers seek an injunction, 
pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), 
directing CIGNA to withdraw its current coverage policy for 
OCT and rescind the Physician Update regarding OCT.  In 
Count III, the Providers allege that, by systematically denying 
OCT coverage, CIGNA breached its duty to the Participants 
to faithfully apply the terms of the governing ERISA plans; 
they seek an injunction, pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(3), 
“requiring CIGNA to process claims for OCT benefits in all 
instances based on the terms of the ERISA plans . . . and to 
cease and desist from processing such ERISA claims based 
on any conflicting terms . . . in the 2012 [] Policy.”  App.  52.   
To the extent that any of the assigned claims do not arise 
from or are exempt from ERISA, Count IV asserts that 
CIGNA breached its contractual obligation to the Participants 
by failing to cover medically necessary services.   
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 CardioNet and LifeWatch bring the remaining three 
counts on their own behalf.  These so-called “direct” counts 
primarily concern an alleged harm stemming from CIGNA’s 
distribution of the Physician Update.  In Count V, the 
Providers allege that through the issuance of the Physician 
Update, CIGNA tortiously interfered with the Providers’ 
current and prospective business relations with physicians 
who have ordered, or may in the future order, OCT for their 
patients.  In Count VI, they allege that the Physician Update 
constituted a misleading and deceptive commercial or 
promotion, in violation of § 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).  Finally, Count VII alleges that 
the Physician Update constituted trade libel.  Through Counts 
V-VII, the Providers seek damages, as well as the issuance of 
corrective advertising to the physicians who received the 
Physician Update.   
 
 Shortly after CardioNet and LifeWatch filed this 
action, CIGNA moved to compel arbitration, or in the 
alternative, to stay the action pending arbitration, under 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4.4  The 
District Court agreed with CIGNA that all of the Providers’ 
claims, including those brought on behalf of the Participants, 
fell within the purview of the Agreement’s arbitration clause.  
It therefore compelled arbitration.   
 
 The District Court began by analyzing the relevant 
language in the Agreement concerning arbitration.  It 
                                              
4
 CIGNA also moved to dismiss the Providers’ claims on 
other grounds.  However, the District Court declined to reach 
these alternative arguments. 
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concluded that the arbitration provision was broad, so that the 
presumption in favor of arbitration applied with particular 
force.  CardioNet, Inc. v. Cigna Health Corp., 945 F. Supp. 
2d 620, 625-26 (E.D. Pa. 2013).  The Court then assessed the 
arbitrability of the derivative and direct claims in turn.  As to 
the derivative claims, the District Court acknowledged that 
the Agreement’s arbitration clause could not bind the 
Participants, as “an arbitration clause applies only to the 
parties to the agreement in which it is contained and those 
with whom there is privity of contract.”  Id. at 627.  
Nonetheless, it concluded that the Providers could not 
“pursue the Plan Participants’ claims [in court] through an 
assignment from the Plan Participants to Plaintiffs.”  Id.  The 
District Court reasoned that:  
 
Plaintiffs have a preexisting duty under their 
agreements with CIGNA to arbitrate disputes 
that are substantively identical to the claims 
they now seek to bring as assignees.  All of 
Plaintiffs’ claims rest on the basic argument that 
OCT services should be covered services and 
therefore should be paid for by CIGNA.  This 
argument strikes at the heart of Plaintiffs’ 
contracts with CIGNA, i.e., claims for payment 
by Plaintiffs will be subject to arbitration.  
Plaintiffs cannot nullify their agreements to 
arbitrate these claims for payment by becoming 
assignees of the Plan Participants’ claims.  
 
Id.  Accordingly, the District Court concluded that, while 
“[o]f course, the Plan Participants are free to pursue their 
claims independently, or via an assignment to another third 
party, . . . [i]f Plaintiffs wish to challenge Defendant’s 
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classification of OCT services as [experimental, investigative, 
and unproven], they must arbitrate their claims, as they had 
agreed to do under the [Agreement].”  Id.  
 
 The District Court next evaluated the direct claims.  
These too, it determined, were barred by the Agreement’s 
arbitration clause.  The District Court explained that “the 
foundation of Counts V through VII”—the Providers’ 
allegation that the Physician Update deterred physicians from 
ordering OCT—“clearly falls within the scope of the 
[Agreement’s] arbitration clauses.  To the extent that 
Plaintiffs disagree on whether OCT services should be 
classified as [experimental, investigative, and unproven] or as 
covered, this disagreement must be resolved under the terms 
of the arbitration provision.”  Id. at 628.   
 
 The Providers now appeal the compulsion of 
arbitration of both the direct and the derivative claims.
 5
  
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
 In the vast majority of cases, the arbitrability of a 
dispute is a question for judicial determination.  See First 
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) 
                                              
5
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 9 U.S.C. § 
16(a)(3).  We exercise “plenary review over the District 
Court’s order compelling arbitration.”  Bouriez v. Carnegie 
Mellon Univ., 359 F.3d 292, 294 (3d Cir. 2004).  
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(“Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ 
evidence that they did so.” (quoting AT & T Techs., Inc. v. 
Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)) 
(alterations in original).  Because neither party questions the 
propriety of the District Court determining whether the 
dispute is arbitrable, we assume, without further analysis, that 
the Agreement leaves the question of arbitrability to judicial 
determination.  See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2856 n.5 (2010).  
  
 Until a court determines whether arbitration should be 
compelled, however, judicial review is limited to two 
threshold questions: “(1) Did the parties seeking or resisting 
arbitration enter into a valid arbitration agreement? (2) Does 
the dispute between those parties fall with the language of the 
arbitration agreement?”  John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 137 (3d Cir. 1998).  Because neither 
party contests the validity of the Agreement, we confine 
ourselves to assessing whether the disputes at issue fall within 
the scope of the Agreement’s arbitration clause.   
 
  The FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-13, establishes “a uniform 
federal law over contracts which fall within its scope.”  
Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 1984).  
This uniform federal law places “arbitration agreements on an 
equal footing with other contracts,” and requires courts to 
“enforce them according to their terms.”  AT & T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); see also 
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 130 S.Ct. 
2772, 2776 (2010) (“The FAA reflects the fundamental 
principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”); Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (“The 
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preeminent concern of Congress in passing the [FAA] was to 
enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, 
and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce 
agreements to arbitrate . . . .”).  Thus, where a written 
agreement evidences an intent on the part of the contracting 
parties to arbitrate the dispute in question, a court must 
compel the parties to arbitrate that dispute.  See Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
626 (1985). 
 
 But the fact that the parties have agreed to arbitrate 
some disputes does not necessarily manifest an intent to 
arbitrate every dispute that might arise between the parties, 
since “[u]nder the FAA, ‘parties are generally free to 
structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.’” Green 
Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 458 (2003) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. 
of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 
(1989)).  Accordingly, “a court may order arbitration of a 
particular dispute only where the court is satisfied that the 
parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.”  Granite Rock, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2856 (emphasis in original).  Ultimately, then, whether 
a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration clause 
depends upon the relationship between (1) the breadth of the 
arbitration clause, and (2) the nature of the given claim.   
 
 We must resolve “any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues . . . in favor of arbitration.”  Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 
(1983); see also Medtronic AVE, Inc. v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 247 F.3d 44, 55 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(noting that “federal policy favors arbitration”).  However, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against 
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“overread[ing its] precedent[]” concerning the presumption of 
arbitrability.  E.g. Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2857.  The 
presumption in favor of arbitration does not “take[] courts 
outside [the] settled framework” of using principles of 
contract interpretation to determine the scope of an arbitration 
clause.  Id. at 2859.  Quite the contrary, the presumption 
“derives its legitimacy from” the judicial supposition “that 
arbitration of a particular dispute is what the parties intended 
because their express agreement to arbitrate was validly 
formed and (absent a provision clearly and validly 
committing such issues to an arbitrator) is legally enforceable 
and best construed to encompass the dispute.”  Id. at 2859-60; 
see also Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress 
Int’l, Ltd., 1 F.3d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 1993).  Indeed, while the 
FAA “embodies a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, 
. . . the duty to arbitrate remains one assumed by contract.”  
Sweet Dreams Unlimited, 1 F.3d at 641.  Thus, the 
presumption of arbitrability applies only where an arbitration 
agreement is ambiguous about whether it covers the dispute at 
hand.  See Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2858-59.  Otherwise, 
the plain language of the contract controls. 
 
 In assessing whether a particular dispute falls within 
the scope of an arbitration clause, we “focus [] on the factual 
underpinnings of the claim rather than the legal theory alleged 
in the complaint.”  Medtronic AVE, Inc., 247 F.3d at 55 
(quotation marks omitted).  In so doing, we “prevent[] a 
creative and artful pleader from drafting around an otherwise-
applicable arbitration clause.”  Chelsea Family Pharmacy, 
PLLC v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., 567 F.3d 1191, 1198 
(10th Cir. 2009). 
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B. 
 
  We begin by “carefully analyz[ing] the contractual 
language” in the arbitration clause at issue. Trap Rock Indus., 
Inc. v. Local 825, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 982 F.2d 
884, 888 (3d Cir. 1992).  The Agreement contains the 
following two paragraphs concerning alternative dispute 
resolution, and no other:
6
 
 
6.3  Internal Dispute Resolution.  Disputes that 
might arise between the parties regarding the 
performance or interpretation of the Agreement 
must first be resolved through the applicable 
internal dispute resolution process outlined in 
the Administrative Guidelines.  In the event the 
dispute is not resolved through that process, 
either party can request in writing that the 
parties attempt in good faith to resolve the 
dispute promptly by negotiation . . . .  If the 
matter is not resolved within 60 days of such a 
request, either party may initiate arbitration by 
providing written notice to the other.  With 
respect to a payment or termination dispute, 
Provider must submit a request for arbitration 
within 12 months . . .  If arbitration is not 
requested within that 12 month period, 
CIGNA’s final decision under its internal 
dispute resolution process will be binding on 
Provider, and Provider shall not bill CIGNA, 
                                              
6
 The full text of Sections 6.3 and 6.4 is set forth in Appendix 
“A” to this Opinion. 
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Payor or the Participant for any payment denied 
because of the failure to timely submit a request 
for arbitration. 
 
6.4  Arbitration.  If the dispute is not resolved 
through CIGNA’s internal dispute resolution 
process, either party can initiate arbitration by 
providing written notice to the other.   If one of 
the parties initiates arbitration, the proceeding 
will be held in the jurisdiction of Provider’s 
domicile.  The parties will jointly appoint a 
mutually acceptable arbitrator. . . .  Arbitration 
is the exclusive remedy for the resolutions of 
disputes under this Agreement.  The decision of 
the arbitrator will be final, conclusive and 
binding . . . . 
 
App. 69 (emphasis added). 
 
 The above-quoted language makes clear that only 
those disputes “regarding the performance or interpretation of 
the Agreement” must be arbitrated.  True, the phrase 
“regarding the performance or interpretation of the 
Agreement” appears in the internal dispute resolution 
paragraph (Section 6.3), rather than the mandatory arbitration 
paragraph (Section 6.4).  But it is clear from the language of 
the two sections that the parties intended them to be read 
together, as two stages of mandatory dispute resolution.  
Section 6.3 explains that where a dispute subject to that 
provision cannot be resolved using the internal dispute 
resolution process, “either party may initiate arbitration.”  
Section 6.4 then outlines what form such an arbitration will 
take.  The first sentence of Section 6.4 requires arbitration not 
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of “all” or “any” disputes between the parties, but of only 
“the dispute” that the parties failed to resolve through the 
internal process outlined in Section 6.3.   Hence, Section 6.4 
mandates the arbitration of only those disputes subject to the 
internal dispute resolution process outlined in Section 6.3.  
And Section 6.3 only applies to those “[d]isputes that might 
arise between the parties concerning the performance and 
interpretation of the Agreement.”  Accordingly, Section 6.4 
must be limited to disputes concerning the Agreement’s 
“performance or interpretation.” 
 
 The District Court similarly reached the conclusion 
that Sections 6.3 and 6.4 call for “the arbitration of disputes 
related to the ‘interpretation or performance’ of the 
agreement.”  CardioNet, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 626.  The District 
Court intimated, however, that the statement in the middle of 
Section 6.4 that “[a]rbitration is the exclusive remedy for the 
resolutions of disputes under this Agreement” broadens the 
scope of mandatory arbitration.  Id.  We believe that the term 
“disputes” as used here refers solely to those disputes 
concerning the “performance or interpretation of the 
Agreement.”  As we have explained previously, courts  “are 
required to read contract language in a way that allows all the 
language to be read together, reconciling conflicts in the 
language without rendering any of it nugatory if possible.”  
CTF Hotel Holding, Inc. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 381 F.3d 131, 
137 (3d Cir. 2004).  Were we to hold that “disputes” as used 
here signifies a broader swath of disagreements, it would 
render the first sentence of Section 6.4 devoid of meaning.  
Moreover, as the Providers note, the words “dispute” and 
“disputes” are used three other times in these two sections, 
each time clearly referring to the narrower set of disputes 
concerning the Agreement’s performance and interpretation.  
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Accordingly, we believe that the word “disputes,” as 
employed here, must be circumscribed.  See Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 202 cmt. d (“Meaning is inevitably 
dependent on context.  A word changes meaning when it 
becomes part of a sentence, the sentence when it becomes 
part of a paragraph.”). 
 
 We therefore conclude that the arbitration clause in 
this case is limited in scope to disputes “regarding the 
performance or interpretation of the Agreement.” 7   
 
                                              
7
 The parties spend sizeable portions of their briefs disputing 
whether this arbitration clause is properly categorized as 
“broad” or “narrow.”   The presumption of arbitrability is 
“particularly applicable” where the arbitration clause is a 
broad one.   AT & T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650.  However, as we 
have noted, the presumption of arbitrability is relevant only 
where the scope of the arbitration clause is ambiguous.  See 
Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2858-60.  Here, the arbitration 
provision is not ambiguous.  In any event, as the arbitration 
provision here “implicate[s only] interpretation or 
performance of the contract per se,” it does not sweep beyond 
the confines of the contract, and is therefore narrow in scope.  
Sweet Dreams, 1 F.3d at 642; see also Mediterranean Enters., 
Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(contrasting arbitration clauses that sweep broadly with those 
“intended to cover a much narrower scope of disputes, i.e., 
only those relating to the interpretation and performance of 
the contract itself”); cf. Battaglia v. McKendry, 233 F.3d 720, 
724-25 (3d Cir. 2000) (an arbitration clause not “limited to 
disputes involving the interpretation and performance of the 
Settlement Agreement” is broad). 
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C. 
 
 We next consider whether the claims at issue relate to 
the performance or interpretation of the Agreement.  
 
 First, we examine whether the Providers’ direct claims 
fall under the scope of the arbitration clause.  CIGNA 
contends that the direct claims relate to the performance and 
interpretation of the Agreement, because they “unavoidably 
implicate Cigna’s contractual obligation to treat as ‘Covered 
Services’ any services that participants are entitled to receive 
under their benefits plans.”  Appellee’s Br. at 30.  We 
disagree. 
 
 Again, in determining whether these claims at issue 
relate to the performance and interpretation of the Agreement, 
we focus on the factual underpinnings of the claim rather than 
the legal theories asserted in the Complaint.  Although styled 
as distinct statutory and common law causes of action, the 
Providers’ trade libel, Lanham Act, and tortious interference 
claims rest upon identical factual assertions: CIGNA made 
false and misleading statements in the Physician Update 
about the nature and quality of OCT;  CIGNA conveyed the 
false impression that OCT would never be covered under any 
health plans CIGNA administers; and the Physician Update 
injured them by decreasing the number of physicians willing 
to use OCT services.
8
   
                                              
8
 We take no position here on CIGNA’s argument in the 
District Court that the direct counts fail to state cognizable 
claims.  We simply assume for the time being that they do.   
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 Thus, the adjudication of CIGNA’s direct claims 
depends on whether the Physician Update—a document 
completely distinct from the Agreement—is deceptive and 
misleading, and whether any deceptions therein caused a 
cognizable injury to the Providers.  The resolution of these 
claims does not require construction of, or even reference to, 
any provision in the Agreement.  Cf. RCM Techs., Inc. v. 
Brignik Tech., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 550, 555 (D.N.J. 2001) 
(fraudulent inducement claims were subject to arbitration 
where “the claims in this case almost undoubtedly will 
require interpretation of the parties’ agreement”).  Quite the 
contrary, whether CIGNA performed its obligations under the 
Agreement has no bearing on whether it harmed the Providers 
by providing physicians with misleading information on 
OCT. 
 
 Indeed, it is not even clear to us that the Agreement is 
a factual predicate to these claims.  Theoretically, any OCT 
manufacturer, whether it had entered into an in-network 
Agreement with CIGNA or not, would be harmed by the 
misleading statements ostensibly made by CIGNA about the 
OCT technology and would have a basis for bringing claims 
identical to the Providers’ claims here.  In any event, factual 
connections between the Agreement and the factual 
underpinnings of the Complaint do not render these claims 
arbitrable.
9
  
                                              
9
 Thus, the fact that the “[C]omplaint references the 
Agreements extensively” is of no moment.  See Appellee’s 
Br. at 21.  The Complaint does indeed discuss the Agreement, 
but it hardly follows from this that the parties’ “performance 
or interpretation” of the Agreement is implicated by the 
Providers’ claims.  Accord Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of 
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 CIGNA brings to our attention an array of circuit and 
district court cases where Lanham Act, tort, and trade 
disparagement claims were held to be arbitrable, noting that 
“[Lanham Act] and tort claims such as those pled in Counts 
V-VII are frequently referred to arbitration when they arise 
out of a contractual relationship.”  Appellee’s Br. at 30.  To 
be sure, CIGNA is correct that Lanham Act and tort claims 
often fall within the scope of different arbitration clauses.  
But that bears little relevance to whether these Lanham Act 
and tort claims fall within the scope of this arbitration clause.  
Again, the arbitrability of a given dispute depends not on the 
particular cause of action pleaded, but on the relationship of 
the arbitration clause at issue to the facts underpinning a 
plaintiff’s claims.  Hence, the cases cited by CIGNA would 
be relevant only if they (1) contained arbitration clauses of a 
similar scope to the one here, and (2) concerned claims whose 
underlying facts bore a similar relationship to the parties’ 
contracts.   
 
As the Providers note, CIGNA’s cases are similar in 
neither respect.  First, those cases concern arbitration clauses 
undisputedly broader than the clause at issue here.  See, e.g., 
Sweet Dreams Unlimited, 1 F.3d at 642-43 (assessing the 
scope of an arbitration clause that sweeps beyond the 
“interpretation or performance of the contract per se” and 
concluding that several of plaintiff’s counts fall within the 
clause’s scope despite the fact that they “do not raise issues of 
                                                                                                     
the Gulf Coast, Inc., 141 F.3d 243, 250-51 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting the argument that a plaintiff’s decision to 
“referenc[e] the agreement in the factual allegations of his 
complaint” suggests that the action falls within the scope of 
an arbitration clause broader than the clause at issue here). 
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contract interpretation or performance”).  Second, the vast 
majority of CIGNA’s cases involve disputes that, unlike the 
direct claims here, clearly do relate to the performance and 
interpretation of the parties’ contracts.  See, e.g., Simula, Inc. 
v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 724 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(compelling arbitration of a Lanham Act claim where 
“resolving Simula’s factual allegations against Autoliv 
requires interpreting Autoliv’s performance and conduct 
under the [parties’] Agreement”); see also Norcom Elecs. 
Corp. v. CIM USA Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 198, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000).  Thus, the cases cited by CIGNA are inapplicable. 
 
 In sum, the facts underpinning these direct claims do 
not concern the performance or interpretation of the parties’ 
Agreement.  Accordingly, the direct claims fall outside the 
scope of the Agreement’s arbitration clause.  The Providers 
may pursue these claims in court. 
 
D. 
 
 We next address the Providers’ derivative claims.  
Again, these claims challenge CIGNA’s decision to deny 
OCT to the Participants and more broadly the implementation 
of the 2012 Policy, which barred future coverage of OCT.  
Through the derivative claims, the Providers seek 
reimbursement for the cost of the OCT services provided to 
the five Participants, as well as injunctive relief requiring 
CIGNA to reverse its policy of denying all claims for OCT.  
We conclude that these claims are not subject to arbitration.
10
 
                                              
10
 In Pascack Valley Hosp., Inc. v. Local 464 A UFCW 
Welfare Reimbursement Plan, 388 F.3d 393, 400 n.7 (3d Cir. 
2004), we declined to take a position on whether a health care 
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 CIGNA concedes that, as non-signatories, the 
Participants would not be bound by the arbitration clause 
were they to bring the claims directly.  CIGNA nonetheless 
maintains that allowing the Providers to pursue the 
Participants’ ERISA claims in court would “vitiate the 
arbitration provision of the [Agreement],” Appellee’s Br. at 
27, since at the core of the Providers’ dispute is simply a 
claim for reimbursement under the Agreement.  The District 
Court reached the same conclusion, stating that “the 
arbitration provision provides the exclusive remedy for 
Plaintiffs’ claims regarding payment for covered services” 
and that “Plaintiffs cannot nullify their agreements to arbitrate 
these claims for payment by becoming assignees of the Plan 
Participants’ claims.”  CardioNet, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 627.   
 
 As we see it, this line of argument suffers from two 
independent infirmities.  First, we do not agree that the 
                                                                                                     
provider has standing to assert claims assigned by a patient 
under Section 502(a) of ERISA.  We noted, however, that 
“almost every circuit to have considered the issue” had 
concluded that providers have standing, and we rejected the 
argument that we had previously taken a contrary view.  Id.  
In the wake of Pascack Valley, the lower courts in this Circuit 
have assumed that we, like our sister circuits, permit health 
care providers to assert properly assigned ERISA claims on 
behalf of their patients.  See, e.g., N. Jersey Brain & Spine 
Ctr. v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp., 2013 WL 5366400, at *3 
(D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2013).  Here, unlike in Pascack Valley, the 
ability of providers to bring properly assigned ERISA claims 
is squarely before us.  We adopt the majority position that 
health care providers may obtain standing to sue by 
assignment from a plan participant.   
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allegations underlying these claims concern the interpretation 
or performance of the Agreement.  No provision in the 
Agreement concerns the Providers’ underlying contention 
here that CIGNA had a duty to cover OCT.  Rather, the 
Agreement specifically acknowledges that such 
determinations shall be made pursuant to “the terms or 
conditions of the applicable Benefit Plan” governed by 
ERISA.  App. at 64. Therefore, interpreting the Agreement is 
not required, or even useful, in resolving the derivative 
actions.  For the same reason, the allegations underpinning 
these claims cannot be recast as claims for failure to perform 
on the Agreement.   
 
 True, as CIGNA notes, the Agreement provides that 
CIGNA must reimburse the Providers for “Covered 
Services,” and that “[n]o service is a Covered Service unless 
it is Medically Necessary.”  App. at 64.  But this language 
creates no contractual duty on CIGNA to provide specific 
services to its patients, or to construe OCT as a “Covered 
Service.”  Irrespective of the reference to the terms “Covered 
Services” and “Medically Necessary” in the Agreement, the 
Providers lack the ability to bring a claim on their own behalf 
against CIGNA for failing to provide adequate coverage to 
the Participants: any such claim would be preempted by 
ERISA, and therefore would belong, unless and until 
assigned, to the participants and beneficiaries of the ERISA 
plan.  See Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 
278 (3d Cir. 2001) (suits against insurance companies for 
denial of benefits are preempted by ERISA, “even when the 
claim is couched in terms of common law negligence and 
breach of contract”); see also Lone Star OB/GYN Assocs. v. 
Aetna Health Inc., 579 F.3d 525, 530-31 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(explaining that “any determination of benefits under the 
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terms of a plan—i.e., what is ‘medically necessary’ or a 
‘Covered Service’—[] fall[s] within ERISA” and would be 
preempted).  This is not an instance where a plaintiff 
sidesteps an identical contractual right in an attempt to 
sidestep an otherwise-applicable arbitration clause.  Rather, 
claims challenging the denial of service may be brought only 
outside the confines of the Agreement, through ERISA claims 
assigned by CIGNA patients.  The claims clearly do not 
concern the performance and interpretation of the Agreement. 
   
 As the Providers correctly note, CIGNA’s argument to 
the contrary rests on a conflation of claims, such as this one, 
seeking coverage under a benefit plan, and claims seeking 
reimbursement for coverage provided.  The distinction is key.  
As we explained in Pascack Valley, a provider may bring a 
contract action for an insurer’s failure to reimburse the 
provider pursuant to the terms of the agreement, while a claim 
seeking coverage of a service may only be brought under 
ERISA.  388 F.3d at 403-04 (holding that a hospital had an 
independent breach of contract action against the insurer 
because “the dispute here is not over the right to payment, 
which might be said to depend on the patients’ assignments to 
the Providers, but the amount, or level, of payment, which 
depends on the terms of the provider agreements” (emphasis 
in original; quotation marks and alterations omitted)); see 
also Blue Cross of Cal. v. Anesthesia Care Assocs. Med. 
Grp., Inc., 187 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (providers’ 
claim not preempted by ERISA where they “arise from 
[insurer’s] alleged breach of the provider agreements’ 
provisions regarding fee schedules, and the procedure for 
setting them, not what charges are ‘covered’ under the [] 
Plan”).  Here, the Providers’ claims do not concern the 
amount of payment to which they are entitled under the 
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Agreement, but the right to payment under the terms of the 
relevant plans.  Thus, we reject the argument that claims 
“substantively identical” to these would fall within the scope 
of the arbitration clause.  Cf. CardioNet, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 
at 627.  
 
 Second, even if these claims would fall within the 
arbitration clause if brought directly, it does not follow that 
these claims when brought derivatively on behalf of others 
would necessarily fall within the arbitration clause.  Stated 
differently, we fail to see how bringing an assignee’s claim 
derivatively nullifies an assignor’s promise to bring its own 
direct claim through arbitration—at least where, as here, the 
Agreement does not explicitly require the arbitration of 
assigned claims.   
 
 It is a basic principle of assignment law that an 
assignee’s rights derive from the assignor.  That is, “an 
assignee of a contract occupies the same legal position under 
a contract as did the original contracting party, he or she can 
acquire through the assignment no more and no fewer rights 
than the assignor had, and cannot recover under the 
assignment any more than the assignor could recover.”  6A 
C.J.S. Assignments § 110 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, assuming the validity of the Participants’ 
assignments to the Providers, CardioNet and LifeWatch now 
stand in the shoes of the Participants, and have “standing to 
assert whatever rights the assignor[s] possessed.”  Misic v. 
Bldg. Serv. Emp. Health & Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 
1378 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). 
 
 Here, it is undisputed that the Participants possess the 
right to pursue their ERISA claims in court, rather than 
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through mandatory arbitration.  That right does not dissipate 
simply because the claim is brought by assignees who have 
promised to arbitrate certain direct claims they might bring 
against the defendant.  Cf. Conn. State Dental Assoc. v. 
Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337, 1347 (11th Cir. 
2009) (“[A] provider that has received an assignment of 
benefits and has a[n independent] state law claim . . . holds 
two separate claims.” (emphasis added)).  Surely, where an 
assignor has agreed to arbitrate its claims with a defendant, 
the assignor cannot circumvent the arbitration clause by 
assigning her claim to an assignee whose contract with the 
defendant contains no such clause.  Just as the burden of 
arbitration must travel with a claim, so too, must the right to 
litigate.   
 
 Moreover, we have concerns about the policy 
implications of forcing a provider to arbitrate participants’ 
claims against an insurer.  CIGNA proposes that compelling 
arbitration of such claims when brought derivatively by a 
provider does not diminish the substantive rights of 
participants, since “they are free to pursue such claims 
directly in federal court.”  Appellee’s Br. at 29.  But this 
contention trivializes the important public policy interests 
served by permitting providers to bring such claims on behalf 
of plan participants.  As the Fifth Circuit has observed, the 
assignment of ERISA claims to providers serves the interests 
of patients by increasing their access to care: 
 
Many providers seek assignments of benefits to 
avoid billing the beneficiary directly and 
upsetting his finances and to reduce the risk of 
non-payment.  If their status as assignees does 
not entitle them to federal standing against the 
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plan, providers would either have to rely on the 
beneficiary to maintain an ERISA suit, or they 
would have to sue the beneficiary.  Either 
alternative, indirect and uncertain as they are, 
would discourage providers from becoming 
assignees and possibly from helping 
beneficiaries who were unable to pay them “up-
front.” The providers are better situated and 
financed to pursue an action for benefits owed 
for their services. 
 
Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Med. & Benefit Plan, 845 F.2d 
1286, 1289 n.13 (5th Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds 
by Access Mediquip, L.C.C. v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., 
698 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2012).  Were we to prevent providers 
that have promised to arbitrate their own claims against an 
insurer from bringing patients’ claims in court, these 
providers would be less likely to accept patients’ claims in 
exchange for services.  This, in turn, would make it more 
difficult for patients to receive necessary services where their 
insurers have denied coverage.  
 
 Accordingly, even if these claims would be arbitrable 
if brought directly by the Providers, we would not force the 
Providers to arbitrate the claims derivatively—at least, absent 
a clear statement in that Agreement intimating that the parties 
intended to arbitrate such claims.    
 
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Providers’ 
direct and derivative claims fall outside the scope of the 
Agreement’s arbitration clause.  Accordingly, we vacate the 
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order of the District Court and remand for further proceedings 
in accordance with this Opinion. 
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Appendix A 
 
6.3   Internal Dispute Resolution.   Disputes that might arise 
between the  parties regarding the performance or 
interpretation of the Agreement must first be resolved 
through the applicable internal dispute resolution process 
outlined in the Administrative Guidelines.  In the event the 
dispute is not resolved through that process, either party can 
request in writing that the parties attempt in good faith to 
resolve the dispute promptly by negotiation between 
designated representatives of the parties who have authority 
to settle the dispute.   If the matter is not resolved within 60 
days of such a request, either party may initiate arbitration  by 
providing written notice to the other.  With respect to a 
payment or termination dispute, Provider must submit a 
request for arbitration within 12 months of the date of the 
letter communicating the final decision under CIGNA’s 
internal dispute resolution process unless applicable law 
specifically requires a longer time period to request 
arbitration.  If arbitration is not requested within that 12 
month period, CIGNA’s final decision under its internal 
dispute resolution process will be binding on Provider, and 
Provider shall not bill CIGNA, Payor or the Participant for 
any payment denied because of the failure to timely submit a 
request for arbitration. 
 
6.4  Arbitration.  If the dispute is not resolved through CIGNA's 
internal dispute resolution process, either party can initiate 
arbitration  by providing written notice to the other. If one of 
the parties initiates arbitration, the proceeding will be held in 
the jurisdiction of Provider’s domicile.   The parties will 
jointly appoint a mutually acceptable arbitrator.  If the parties 
are unable to agree upon such an arbitrator within 30 days 
after one of the parties has notified the other of the desire to 
submit a dispute for arbitration, then the parties will prepare 
a Request for a Dispute Resolution List and submit it to the 
American Health Lawyers Association Alternative Dispute 
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Resolution  Service (AHLA ADR Service) along with the 
appropriate administration fee.  Under the Codes of Ethics 
and Rules of Procedure developed by the AHLA ADR 
Service, the parties will be sent a list of 10 arbitrators along 
with a background and experience description, references and 
fee schedule for each.  The 10 will be chosen by the AHLA 
ADR Service on the basis of their experience in the area of 
the dispute, geographic location and other criteria as indicated 
on the request form.   The parties will review the 
qualifications of the 10 suggested arbitrators and rank them 
in order of preference from 1 to 9.  Each party has the right to 
strike 1 of the names from the list.  The person with the 
lowest total will be appointed to resolve the case.  Each party 
will assume its own costs, but the compensation and expenses 
of the arbitrator and any administrative fees or costs will be 
borne equally by the parties, subject to any limitation  on fees 
or costs required under the MDL No. 1334 Settlement 
Agreement Among CIGNA HealthCare  and Healthcare 
Providers during the period of time such requirements are in 
effect.  Arbitration is the exclusive remedy for the resolution 
of disputes under this Agreement.  The decision of the 
arbitrator will be final, conclusive and binding, and no action 
at law or in equity may be instituted by CIGNA or Provider 
other than to enforce the award of the arbitrator. The parties 
intend this alternative dispute resolution procedure to be a 
private undertaking and agree that an arbitration conducted 
under this provision will not be consolidated  with an 
arbitration involving other physicians or third parties, and that 
the arbitrator will be without power to conduct an arbitration 
on a class basis.  Judgment upon the award rendered by the 
arbitrator may be entered in any court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
